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Only a few authors have been as influential as Jörn Rüsen as regards the 
ongoing debate on history of historiography and, above all, theory of history in 
the Brazilian academic scene. In fact, since the 1970s there was a continuous 
flow of Brazilian scholars heading towards Bielefeld, Bochum and then Essen, in 
order to rejoin – through Rüsen’s conveyance – with a theoretical tradition from 
which we seemed to be since long torn apart. It was hence a matter of course 
when a larger Brazilian audiences, which during the 1990s began to approach 
Rüsen’s project of updating and expanding the German tradition of Historik, 
enthusiastically welcomed his lecture tour of Brazil that took place in the spring 
of 2010. In this occasion, Rüsen surprised his audience with a great willingness 
for dialoguing with Brazilian students and professors, as well as for traveling 
through the great distances that separate Mariana, Brasília, Curitiba, Goiânia, 
Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo.
While visiting the History Department of the Federal University of Ouro 
Preto, Prof. Rüsen was interviewed by Sérgio da Mata and Valdei Lopes de 
Araujo. In what follows, there is a transcripted and edited version of this talk, 
in which Rüsen addressed issues such as: old and new classics of metahistorical 
reflection, the concept of “unprethinkable”, the possibility of anthropological 
universals, and the demand for a refreshed idea of humanism.
1. Valdei Lopes de Araujo: Maybe we could start by talking about your feelings 
about theory of history in Brazil. I know that you have been with Prof. Estevão 
Martins in Brasília and Goiânia. Perhaps you could tell us what you think of the 
future of theory of history in Brazil. 
Jörn Rüsen: The first thing I have to mention is my surprise when I found out 
that you in Brazil have a very strong discourse and work in theory of history. You 
have a network of experts, you have a discourse full of life and ideas, you have 
your own academic journal, and an association of scholars. That is astonishing, 
because in Europe we usually don’t find such an intensive work brought about by 
a rather big number of experts. An exception is the situation in the Netherlands, 
but even there you don’t have as many experts and people who are competent in 
doing theory of history as in Brazil. The problem I see is that this network is not 
known outside Brazil. You can call it a scandal, because the Brazilian colleagues 
do work on the highest level, so you’re marching in the front of the development. 
It’s of course a question of language: except for some specialists in Brazilian- 
-Portuguese history, nobody reads and speaks Portuguese. It’s like German, and 
that’s the reason why it’s not known. I would very much like to recommend a new 
strategy for the theorists here in Brazil: Get your works known outside Brazil, send 
texts in English translations or originally written in English to the international 
journals, and do what you can to get a representative text, a collective book 
translated into English. This would be a worthwhile venture, because theory of 
history is not an established sub-discipline in historical studies, and Brazil has 
done theory for more than half a century. It’s a wonderful experience that it’s 
living here and it has a bright future in your country. 
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2. Sérgio da Mata: How do you see the situation of theory of history in Germany 
today? Do you think the interest on the field has decreased?
Jörn Rüsen: This question isn’t easy to answer. There is a strong and a good 
tradition of metahistory in Germany. The most emblematic figure in this field 
was Johann Gustav Droysen. But, nevertheless, theory of history is not well 
established. In the past, there were some specific chairs and positions in theory 
of history. But most of them vanished, and I’m not so sure whether today there 
is even a single position that is exclusively dedicated to theory. Young people 
want to get a job, and if you’re only specializing in historical theory your chances 
to get a good job are very small. Well, I made a career with my specialization in 
theory, in between historical studies and philosophy. But this was an exception: 
I’m an outsider. I could make my way only by chance. In your country, things 
are different. This is really astonishing, and, of course, I appreciate it very much. 
 Another reason for the weakening of theory of history on the international 
level are recent internal developments within the metahistorical debate. Lately, 
many historical theorists have been emphasizing rather the writing of history, the 
aesthetic and rhetorical elements in the procedures of sense generation, than the 
rational, methodical, scientific, academic character of doing history as a profession. 
Most historians are not competent regarding aesthetic and rhetorical matters, so 
they have to rely on scholars from literary studies and philosophy, like Hayden 
White. Actually, many good books about historiography have been written by 
experts in literary studies, who know a lot about what telling stories is about. But 
unfortunately, they don’t know very much about the historical discipline itself. On 
the other hand, historians have problems to join the discourse about the literary 
structure of historiography, because professional historians consider themselves 
as researchers. They think of themselves as scientists (in the German and the 
Portuguese meaning of the word); they don’t feel like poets or writers.
3. VLA: In the 19th century, some Germans theorists frequently pointed to 
a connection between history as a science and history as a form of art, as a 
literary genre. Authors like Wilhelm von Humboldt stressed that historians were 
scientists, whose activity had close connections to imagination. Is this distance 
between theorists, on one side, and historians, on the other, a 20th century 
phenomenon? 
Jörn Rüsen: Yes, it is. Humboldt is, of course, a good example. But he is not 
representative for historical studies as an academic discipline. Nevertheless, you 
can find similar statements by Ranke, as well. Ranke said: history is at the same 
time science and art. In the course of the 19th century, the importance of both 
sides of the practice of history was not completely overlooked, but the emphasis 
was on the scientific side, because science had a very prestigious position within 
the general cultural framework. Of course, such a prestige didn’t derive directly 
from the humanities as sciences, but rather from the natural sciences; and thus 
the humanities, and at the end of the 19th century the new social sciences, too, 
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tried to participate in the cultural prestige science had gained. Therefore, you can 
see why excellent historians like Droysen and others used to emphasize method 
in their reflections on the work of the historians. When they thought about 
method, they in the first place meant source-criticism as a strong methodical 
procedure. By stressing this procedure, they were aiming at coming close to 
the prestigious field of the natural sciences. On the other side, the art of writing 
was not forgotten. Gervinus for instance, a famous 19th century historian, wrote 
a Historik (a theory of historical studies) as a theory of history writing. A real 
synthesis of both sides or dimensions in the reflection on what historians do 
is rare, and sometimes I even think it has not yet been accomplished. Such a 
synthesis is difficult, because art follows a different logic of sense-generation 
than science by method. And those who emphasize the literary character of the 
work of historians are not interested in the methodical aspects of research – in 
fact they tend to flagrantly ignore them! This is a lack in the awareness of what 
history is about. And of course many professional historians do indeed recognize 
this gap, but they will rather spend time going into archives. They also prefer 
to teach students on how to learn about the past instead of how to write texts. 
What the specialists who are interested in analyzing the writing of history 
haven’t provided so far is an analysis of the special character of texts that are 
typical for scholars, history university professors, and historical researchers. 
As a matter of fact, they use to read works like 19th century German History, 
or The rise of this or that people, and they analyze Leopold von Ranke and his 
great work, as well as some other famous English and French historians, of 
course. But do they read and analyze the specific academic texts, like articles in 
scholarly journals? These journals as they were founded during the 19th century 
in all western countries represent much more the new way of doing history, the 
professional, the scientific way. It would be worthwhile to read the first issues 
of these prestigious journals in order to see what they stated about history as 
an academic discipline. All these journals emphasized that objectivity has to 
be attained by solid archival research. It is also very interesting that all these 
different journals followed an anti-rhetorical intention: they used to say “we 
don’t do rhetoric!”. There is a very famous quote by Ranke polemicizing against 
rhetoric and claiming for “the naked truth”. Ironically spoken: the most naked 
truth in historical writing is the footnote. I have missed in all this literature on 
historiography a clear analysis of the linguistic indications for truth claims and 
for rational argumentation. There is a very famous text – in a way it has become 
a classic – by Roland Barthes, Le discours de l’histoire (1967), which represents 
this lack of awareness. Barthes starts his paper with a radical criticism on 
historical studies’ scientific claims. He calls these a scholarly “schizophrenia”, 
i.e. he assumes that historians do not know what they are doing. Supposedly, 
they write texts as all older historians like Machiavelli and Thucydides did. This 
similarity is true. Barthes was able to show that modern professional historians 
used similar strategies in forming a historical representation. But he never asked 
the question “what makes the difference between the old and the new texts”? 
There is a difference, of course. Modern academic historiography is based on 
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research. If a professional historian does not refer to solid research, nobody will 
take him or her seriously, except the meta-historians who only look for narrative 
styles and overlook the implications that came out of the professionalization 
of historiography. Hayden White was very clear on this when he said that 
professionalism only brings about bad narratives. 
4. SM: There is a whole generation of 19th century authors that elaborated 
a theoretical foundation for historical science. In your lecture, you criticized 
authors like Rickert, Windelband and even Dilthey. What, in your opinion, was 
not achieved by them? What was “missing”? 
Jörn Rüsen: First of all, we have to correctly characterize the work of these 
people, including Max Weber and a lot of others: this kind of work is frequently 
called philosophy of history. But it is in fact an epistemology of historical thinking. 
They are less interested in history as a process of temporal change of the human 
world in the past, but rather in the way historians treat the past. Their main 
interest was to show what the distinctive nature of historical cognition is about, 
since it differs from physics and the natural sciences. History does not bring 
about a law of historical development – actually, Marxism tried to emphasize 
this last point, but that is a different story. History doesn’t follow the logic 
of the natural scientific argumentation, but, nevertheless, modern historical 
thinking has some essentially rational or scientific elements. The thinkers 
you’ve mentioned emphasized a basic difference between history and natural 
sciences. The first one who did it was Johann Gustav Droysen, who distinguished 
understanding (Verstehen) and explanation (Erklären) as different modes of 
cognition. Understanding is the basic cognitive attitude of the humanities, while 
explaining is that of the natural sciences. Dilthey picked up this distinction and 
gave it an extended epistemological explanation and foundation. Weber followed 
Droysen as well (mainly influenced by Rickert); he combined the epistemological 
with a methodological argumentation. Rickert was not so much interested in 
hermeneutical methodology, but rather in the logical procedures of historical 
thinking. He characterized the difference between the two realms of cognition 
as individualization and generalization. 
This distinction was very successful. But later on, it changed, when the 
distinctive nature of historical cognition was defined by pointing out to its 
narrative structure. The starting point for this new characterization was the 
question of rational explanation. C. G. Hempel described it by referring to the 
natural sciences: they explain by putting single cases into a general law. This 
model was applied to historical thinking, but it was difficult to identify historical 
laws. It was Arthur Danto who gave a much more plausible answer to the 
question on what a historical explanation is. He pointed to a very specific form 
of explaining things that is completely different from the rational explanation of 
the natural sciences: explaining by telling a story. That was an epistemological 
breakthrough; I have become convinced of it because of my close connexion 
to the German philosopher Hans Michael Baumgartner, who introduced Danto’s 
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analytical philosophy of history into the German discussion on philosophy of 
history. Telling a story is a very specific form of explaining why things happened. 
With the discovery of the narrative structure of historical knowledge, metahistory 
as epistemology took a new direction, that of asking how historians come into 
view as writers. Analyzing historical texts as narratives brought the rationality 
of historical thinking out of view. With the discovery of the narrative structure 
of historical thinking, epistemology of history has dramatically changed. 
Metahistory no longer referred to Rickert or to Max Weber’s methodology of 
ideal types, which is based on Rickert’s arguments. This is a pity, since I believe 
that the epistemology and methodology of ideal types have something to do 
with the logic of narration. But this is an open question. 
5. VLA: Would you like to talk about your criticism on constructivism?
Jörn Rüsen: Well, first of all, constructivism is not new. Droysen had already 
said that the past in itself is not history. It is only afterwards that we look at it as 
history. Today, constructivism is a dominant topic in metahistory, because it comes 
close to the idea of history as a form of art. Artists invent meaning. Artists are 
creators. It may be that historians are very happy to learn that they are creators 
of historical meaning, and in fact they are. But you can’t deny that historians bring 
about an input of meaning and an importance of the past to the present, which you 
can already find in the past documents themselves. Furthermore: is the past not 
already effective before the historians give it a meaning? I mean: historians do their 
work in a context, under conditions and in special situations, which are pre-given 
determinants for their construction. In this context and under these conditions, the 
past is present as a result of developments which took place in the past leading 
into the present. I would like to say that before we start to construct history, 
history has already constructed us. Nobody can deny that there are pre-given 
conditions for sense generation without which we can’t understand what historians 
do. What historians do depends upon their age and upon their place in the chain 
of the generations. I, with my 70 years, look at German history in a different 
way than a colleague who is now 30 years old. Historical sense generation is a 
complex mixture or mediation of being already constructed and constructing. Being 
constructed means that elements of sense generation are pre-given and belong to 
the hard facts of social life conditions. David Carr, a very important philosopher of 
history, has made clear that history is more than only a construction; that history 
is an element of social reality. This real pre-given factor of sense generation is 
overlooked in the constructivist theories. Instead of construction, we should speak 
of generating sense. By historical thinking, we refer to something in the past that 
has already features of meaning and sense. The past can be very powerful in the 
form of tradition. Do we invent the meaning of the human race? No. The meaning 
is already – at least partly – there; it has already been pre-given. And what about 
all these documents of the past that are documents of sense or meaning, do we 
construct them? Do the professors in literary studies construct the meaning of their 
subject matter, literature? They may believe it. I don’t. 
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6. SM: At the end of your lecture, however, you used a quite original expression: 
“unprethinkable” (unvordenklich). Could you further explain this concept? 
Jörn Rüsen: This is a very difficult metahistorical subject matter. The argument 
runs as follows: the process of historical sense generation is characterized by 
the simultaneity of being constructed and constructing. While doing history, 
we realize an inbuilt temporality and historicity of our own life. We are living 
in the moment when we do our work as historians and, by doing it, we are 
part of the process that is afterwards addressed as history. Maybe we make a 
big discovery that changes our cultural world. But while doing it, we can’t say 
what the historical outcome will be. The process of working in the field of sense 
generation is only a part of the whole field of the human life practice. It is the 
most real and the most present form of our life we can think about. It is the 
absolute presence of the moment of our doing history. We could even say that 
this doing is the most historical event we can do. Because it is a realization 
of the temporality and historicity of our own life. By doing history, we pursue 
temporality in the cultural world, and history is the temporal occurrence, the 
temporal happening of our own life. By doing history, we don’t know what it 
is as history (this knowledge can only brought about afterwards). At the very 
moment when we start thinking what it would be as a piece of explicit history, 
we’ve already lost it in its presence, and its reality. Now it becomes an object 
of reflection. As such, it has lost its vitality and in a certain way it becomes 
dead, like the past is dead for the historians who go into the archives. But this 
death is not the original reality of the past. It is only a shadow of it. What we 
find in the archives is a shadow of reality. The most real reality of the past is 
the case when we do history. This is my argumentation. But we must be very 
careful not to dissolve the clear distinction between, on the one hand, the 
reflection we call history, which is dedicated to a subject matter, namely, the 
past, and on the other hand, the process of realizing one’s own temporality 
and historicity by means of historical sense generation, which is performed in 
the context of practical human life, and that we may call history, as well. These 
are two different histories. The point is that the second one is the foundation 
of the first one. If we think about it, we have already lost it. Therefore, I use 
the word unprethinkable. 
7. SM: If I may interrupt, is it not the same opposition that Husserl established 
between “natural attitude” and “theoretical attitude”? 
Jörn Rüsen: I’d had to check the word Einstellung. I don’t like it because it is 
already a relationship to something. But the relationship I think about is not a 
relationship but a Vollzug, a doing, a practice – and not a Einstellung. Einstellung 
means a kind of constellation, a mental constellation or something like that. No. 
What I mean is a mental dynamics: that is the point. Vollzug means something 
like in doing, in doing time...
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8. SM - Is it a Handeln (action)?
Jörn Rüsen: Ja! It’s Handeln, of course, but it is more than only a doing; it 
is a Geschehen (event/happening). There is more in Geschehen than in the 
simple doing. In all circumstances – and that is absolutely true – the outcome 
is different from what you thought you should bring about. If there is any law 
in history, it is a law that says that the outcome is always different from the 
intention of the people who are doing something.
9. VLA: If you were to give some advice to younger researchers interested in theory 
of history today, what would you say to them? What are the main challenges to 
the field now after you gave us a huge work on systematic historical theory? 
Jörn Rüsen: Well, I think there are different unsolved problems of highest 
importance. One is the differences and similarities between interpretation 
and representation. Interpretation is a cognitive act that belongs to research. 
Representation is an aesthetic act of forming a narrative. Both are two sides of 
the same coin, but we don’t know what that coin is. It is a text, of course, but 
what kind of text? That is an open question and it should be solved. A second 
issue is methodology. What is a historical concept? As I’ve already mentioned, 
I believe that we have to rethink the logic of building ideal types in respect to 
the narrative structure of historical knowledge. A third challenge for theory of 
history is the growing density of intercultural communication. We do what we do 
in the context of a western tradition – which is a tradition worthwhile to go on 
with. But it is a tradition in which “others” are different. It is a tradition besides 
other traditions. What we have to take much more into account while doing our 
work is the question “how do we come to terms with the fundamental difference 
between peoples, individuals, social units and whole cultures concerning their 
individuality and different identities?” We haven’t addressed the issue of identity 
yet, but historical thinking is a necessary cultural medium to create, present 
and discuss one’s own identity. We as westerners, namely me as a German and 
European westerner, do it in the framework of historical thinking which is the 
dominant medium for formulating my western identity. By doing so, I form the 
identity of others as well. And as long as I say I am a westerner and others are 
not westerners, I state a difference. Whether the others are happy about what 
I say about them, that is a completely different question. Edward Said said that 
he wasn’t, but I am not so convinced whether that “no” is really a good one, but 
that is another question. 
What I mean is that we have to widen the discourse on metahistory into a 
multi-dimensional intercultural discussion by bringing non-western scholars and 
intellectuals into our game, and by listening to them. We have to integrate what 
they experience as western, what they think about us, and what they think their 
own traditions are. Have you ever analyzed in your course on metahistory a text 
by Sima Qian? You did it! But it is not a standard issue. But you, as my young 
colleague, you are on the right track. That is exactly what we have to do. In 
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doing so, we have to confirm and to make clear, what universals are. We make 
use of them when we do our work as metahistorians. It would be nonsense to 
say that everything is culturally limited and that beyond these limits there would 
be nothing. No! There are universals. Of course, there are universals. But what 
do we really know about the inbuilt universality in modern scientific historical 
thinking? The Indians and the Chinese said there is a western historical thinking. 
And they tend to refuse the existence of universals. They speak of indigenous 
knowledge, for instance. But nevertheless, we can discuss with them, we can 
understand each other, so there must be more than only some western and 
some non-western concepts. Otherwise, how could we understand each other? 
We have to work with our non-western colleagues on the universals and at 
the same time on the differences on the basis of these universals. We have 
some paradigms for doing this. For me, for instance, the work of Max Weber is 
a very convincing western paradigm: how to come to terms with a variety of 
cultural manifestations of different human life forms? Max Weber’s Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society) is an impressive text in which different 
possibilities of human practical life were put on the table as a conceptual means 
to find out cultural differences on the basis of universals like Zweckrationalität 
(purportive rationality) and elements of Sinnrationalität (rationality of sense 
and meaning). This is a third field where you’ll find a very interesting challenge. 
And I think of a great opportunity for you people, as Brazilians. You belong to 
a certain degree to the western tradition, but as Brazilians and Latin Americans 
you have in your culture a kind of relationship to traditions that we don’t have 
in Europe. Because of the different context of your own history, there is a 
great chance for historians and philosophers in Brazil to start an intercultural 
discourse under better preconditions than those we have in Europe. You should 
take yourself as Brazilians and Latin Americans more seriously than you have 
been doing until today. 
10. VLA: We can say that your work is an attempt to recover some core 
concepts of the modern tradition of rationality in history as a meaning and as 
a process, which originated within the German tradition of historicism, and I 
think it is a very successful attempt to recover those concepts. But if you had 
to point some misleading paths in modern historiography or historical thought 
what would you mention? 
Jörn Rüsen: There is a very strong tradition in the western culture from the 
very beginning and onwards, which has become very strong in modern times. 
In Science as a vocation Max Weber called it durch Berechnen beherrschen. 
That means that by rational thinking you can become the master of the subject 
matter you are thinking about. So for instance through the natural sciences 
we can become the masters of nature. For sure, this can lead to catastrophic 
results, but we will never come out of  technology. We need it. I’m talking about 
an attitude of mastering, the dream of mastering. This dream was present in 
the work of 19th century historians, too, even though in a hidden form. Today 
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we call 19th century historians the “priests of Clio”, and by doing so we mean 
they were in a way the masters of meaning. Such an attitude is very dangerous. 
Let me say it in a very old fashioned way: we need some humility and modesty 
while doing our work. The second mistake or limit of modern historical thinking 
is that it suppresses to a high degree the basic human experience of suffering. 
You can find very impressive words on suffering in Ranke or Herder. In one of 
the introductions to his Lectures, Ranke expressed of the misdeeds men did to 
other men and how the chain of these misdeeds had come to the present; and 
then he said that one tends to turn the back to one’s past in order to complain, 
and things like that. But then comes the big “but”: that we know it better, since 
at the core of all these changes is the divine force in history. And then you have 
this idealistic philosophy, and later on you have another one, a materialistic one. 
But after the Holocaust and the crimes against humanity of the 20th 
century, we can’t go on with business as usual. Actually, my most convincing 
example of a fundamental misconception in historical studies is what historians 
did after the end of the First World War. What did they do? Business as usual. 
Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were killed in an industrial way. What about 
the reactions in the work of the historians against this explosion of inhumanity? 
Even when new forms of historical thinking did come about, in Germany as well 
in France, were they a convincing answer to the catastrophe of western culture 
and civilization in the Great War? I don’t think so. We still have to think about 
human inhumanity, about human suffering, about events of senselessness that 
afterwards cannot get sense and meaning. Can we give the Holocaust historical 
sense? It would be an intellectual suicide to think that we can’t. Here we have 
some basic fundamental dimensions of historical thinking we still have to explore. 
We have no alternative but doing it. And there is a consequence that is very 
important: there are dark elements in history. You know what I, as a German, 
am immediately thinking about. But even nations that did not commit genocide 
have some black spots in their self-awareness. The regular way of treating these 
black spots is either to suppress them or to put them out of the historical image 
of oneself or of one’s own people and insert them into the image of the others. 
Here we find a mental root of what is called the “clash of civilizations”. Normally 
it happens rather peacefully, but in certain circumstances it becomes bloody. 
What we have to bring about – and this comes close to what I’ve said about 
inhumanity and suffering – is a way to integrate the shadow of one’s past into 
the concepts of one’s own historical identity. The Germans were forced to do that 
by the circumstances of post-war Germany. Others were not forced, but they 
are doing it, too. The Holocaust is a paradigmatic example, but it’s not the only 
one. The second post-war generation of Dutch historians asked “why were the 
Germans able to bring so many Jews into the death camps?” There were very 
few Germans in the administration of the defeated Netherlands. The answer 
is clear: the Dutch bureaucracy helped them. And suddenly they disovered a 
shadow in their own history. Don’t misunderstand me: I don’t attempt to make 
the German guilt less burdening. My argument is a more structural one; it is a 
theoretical argument about the mental processes of forming historical identity. 
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This process is one of the core issues of metahistory. If we are able to integrate 
the shadows of our own history into our historical identity, we attain a new 
relationship to the others. For me that is one of the most important conditions 
under which mutual recognition of differences is possible. 
11. VLA: It seems that the tradition of theory of history as developed by historians 
did not fully integrate the contributions of a thinker as influential as Heidegger. 
I am thinking specifically in categories like historicity and temporality. Reinhart 
Koselleck stands as an exception, if one admits that his project of a history of 
concepts and his Historik can be regarded as a direct answer to that tradition. 
How you evaluate that absence?
Jörn Rüsen: The problem of approaching Heideggerian concepts such as 
temporality is how do you get from such a theory to real history. I believe that 
it is true that history can only be conceptualized in the framework of concepts 
which are anthropologically fundamental in general. That is what Koselleck 
(1997) said in his text. And he proposed categories like old and young, master 
and servant and some others.
12. VLA: Enemy and friend…
Jörn Rüsen: And this one, Freund und Feind, which comes from Carl Schmitt is 
the most important for him. Killing and dying is another one. This is convincing; 
it is convincing that this is a form within which all human life practices take 
place. But they are a-temporal concepts: it is true for all times, for all spaces, 
for all societies. But how do you come from this general binary categorization 
to temporal processes? Whatever history is about, it is in any case based on the 
fundamental existential experience of change. You can even use Heidegger again: 
Endlichkeit, or Werden or Vergehen (finitude, becoming, vanishing). To grow, to 
become, to experience things coming and going: all this is elemental. You have 
to die, people are born. You can conceptualize these things in an anthropological 
way as something that is valid to every human being. What about the distinctive 
nature of this change, because it’s a change of real things? A change in the 
form of domination, a change in the interrelation of people, a change in the 
attitude in organizing social life, a change in the way of appropriating nature 
through labor – these are most obvious things historians speak about. And 
this is the question: you must think in a way so that these real changes can be 
thought, conceptualized, perceived, as coming from that general transcendental 
existential categorization. Here is the point Koselleck stops on and says: “Well, 
Historik is the theory of the conditions of possibility for all possible histories”. But 
how do you come from possibility to reality? And here I see the limit in Heidegger, 
as well. Heidegger’s category of Geschichtlichkeit is empty. Every human life is 
geschichtlich, historical, but then it doesn’t mean very much with respect to the 
basic historical experience that there is only a special change, a special temporal 
development, something concrete, something that has the character of an event. 
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All this is not addressed in Heidegger’s Geschichtlichkeit. You can apply it to all 
places but you never come to principles of sense generation. Geschichtlichkeit 
as such has no sense. It is an empty idea. It can point to the sense of the 
eternity of values through all changes, and so on. But without the possibility of 
deriving sense criteria from the basic anthropological and existential categories, 
you can never come from Geschichtlichkeit to Geschichte. 
Heidegger and this kind of philosophy can be understood – and now this 
comes to my mind, as I speak with you – as a consequence of the experience of 
the First World War. The experience of the First World War and of pre-war times 
can be brought into one sentence: it destroyed all pre-given sense structures, 
and ideas of sense that were very powerful during the 19th century. Let me 
give you an example. The most powerful category of sense that characterized 
19th century historicism was the category of development. Development means 
that what is happening has something to do with current temporal processes. 
You derive from the experience of the past an idea of temporal development, 
and then you can place your own time in that development. That is what Ranke 
did. Historians love to quote that famous dictum by Ranke that “all epochs 
are immediate to God”.1 Well, that is true, but Ranke’s text goes on to say 
that an epoch “has consequences in the process of what comes out of it”. In 
Ranke, it’s a very complex thing to understand an era according to its own 
understanding, that is, to understand it as immediate to God. It has value in 
itself and, at the same time, it has a value for us. This can only be thought 
within the context of a philosophy of history that comes close to Hegel’s or to 
Droysen’s, in which those values have a kind of continuity through time until 
they reach us. Classical historicism goes even a step forward. Historicism did 
not only speak of development as such, because that would be empty as well. 
The point was: “development of what?” And the answer was: the development 
of ideas. Ranke used the term real Geistiges. It means the human spirit as a 
form of social reality. Historicism conceptualized a whole hierarchy of ideas that 
work as forces of change, ideas that are moving human life forms in the change 
of time. Wilhelm von Humboldt published a short article on the moving forces 
of world history (HUMBOLDT 2010, p. 82-100). He would agree with Droysen 
and Hegel that in the deepest ground those moving forces have a spiritual 
character, that is, a character that defines humankind as being different from 
nature. Geist is an untranslatable German term, and therefore the humanities 
were called Geisteswissenschaften. And Geist makes sense. A rather simple but 
very powerful idea. The moving forces in reality constitute historical change by 
the power of ideas. For instance the idea of the State, die Idee des Staates, or 
the idea of civil society. It is the same spirit (Geist) that moves the mind of the 
historians in thinking of the past, or thinking about the past. 
So, both the spirit of historical cognition and the spirit of history as a 
subject matter of cognition are one and the same. In this respect historians are 
1 “Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott, und ihr Wert beruht gar nicht auf dem, was aus ihr hervorgeht, sondern 
in ihrer Existenz selbst, in ihrem eigenen Selbst” (RANKE 1906, p. 17).
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the loudspeakers of historical reality. That comes close to what was meant by 
the expression “priests of Clio”. Historians were thought as the mouth of the 
spirit, who blows human life in reality. This was a very powerful concept of the 
educated middle classes all over Europe. This idealism has to be concretized as 
the spirit moving the minds of the people in their national identity, and therefore 
nationhood was conceived as a highly spiritual thing. In the 19th century, it got 
a quasi-religious feature. Droysen’s is a very fascinating, and a very frightening 
example of that kind of secular religion. 
The plausibility of this concept of sense, which was governed by the 
idealistic notion of Geist, evaporated in the beginning of the 20th century. I 
mean, where is the moving spirit in the class struggle with the proletarians? 
And then you have the newly established power of industry and technology. 
One may say that is a manifestation of the spirit as well, but it’s not the kind of 
spirit you’ll find in a text, in historiography, for instance. It’s not the spirit you’ll 
find in the manifestations of human mind, in culture. The end of the First World 
War was the last step of this loss of sense. What remained? Only the form, but 
no longer a sense bearing content. That is Geschichtlichkeit. And in this respect, 
Heidegger can be understood as a reaction against a massive experience of the 
end of tradition – as well as Max Weber. Heidegger did not express it. Max Weber 
used to characterize the situation of his time as a lack of sense and meaning in 
our approach to social reality. He used the metaphor of darkness and night, and 
night means that the sun does not shine; and the sun is the usual symbol for 
meaning and sense. But keeping up this historicist structure gave the people the 
feeling that they were still going on in doing meaningful work. But they had a 
problem with sense and meaning and the question was what they could find out to 
replace the idealistic sense-generator of Geist. Max Weber said it is simply human 
subjectivity. In his famous article on The Objectivity of Knowledge in the Social 
Sciences he states that we are Kulturmenschen, that we are cultural beings, 
and have the ability to give a meaning to the world. Historicism said the world 
is already meaningful, and we have in ourselves that same spirit we perceive as 
operating in the outside world as the mover of history. Weber’s arguments came 
out of a context in which people were struggling against senselessness. Its most 
radical articulation is Nietzsche’s statement on the death of God – and here we 
should take God as the source and the most essential guaranty for sense and 
meaning. Intellectuals were asking themselves: “where do we now find the 
source for meaning”? Heidegger has a place in this intellectual search for a new 
meaning, and he was as radical as Nietzsche. He said that the whole meaning of 
western culture (he never thought about Asia), the whole intellectual perception 
of meaning in the western culture was over. It started with Plato, Socrates and 
Aristotle; it got its form in metaphysics and it ended with Nietzsche. It has 
its last climax in Hegel, and then this God died. Heidegger wouldn’t say that 
this god did die, but it turned out that God was no longer a reliable source 
for meaning. Because of this, Heidegger’s attitude was the following: let’s go 
back to a time before the beginning of western culture, before the polis, before 
democracy, before argumentation. And that is very typical for the intellectual 
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attitude of a conservative elite, who used to criticize not only modernity, but 
modernity as the latest outcome of traditional western civilization. There are a 
lot of other examples. For instance, Heidegger starts thinking about Anaximander 
and andächtiges Denken, and that comes close to myth. At the time after the 
First World War, we can observe a rehabilitation of myth against rationality. For 
instance in psychoanalysis, there was Jung and his archetypes. Into this context 
belongs also the Nazi movement. The Nazi movement as a cultural movement is 
based on a complete negation of the sense structure of modernity, and it accepted 
all the modernity and technology and all techniques of running systems, while 
completely refusing modernity as a concept of meaning and sense. 
This is my comment, and I wouldn’t say that I now can tell you where the 
real source of meaning is. My proposal is that we should follow the modern way 
of looking for meaning, by asking the famous question: what is a human being? 
This brings us into a fruitful interrelation to classical modern philosophy, and 
especially to Kant. But we have to rethink it after this development. We have 
to rethink our idea of what it is to be a human being vis-à-vis the burdening 
inhumanity of humans in the crimes against humanity. This is much more difficult 
to bring about than what is assumed by systems theory, or by Foucault’s argument 
that we’d better “forget about humans”. But we are humans and not systems. 
Or take the example of Heidegger who said, that we are the shepherds of the 
being and that we have to listen to its commands. This is a typical attempt to 
relate humans to some super-human authority, and this is extremely dangerous 
if you take that politically. Because - to put it simply - in the name of this super-
human sphere, in the name of this higher meaning, in the name of das Sein 
des Seienden, you can treat humans in an inhumane way. This may end up by 
justifying inhumanityfor the sake of a higher value than humanity. We know 
how that works. It can be done in the name of a classless society, ending in the 
killing of the Kulaks, the small land owners, in Russia. It was a mass murder, a 
social genocide. The Nazi killed the Jews in the name of “purifying humanity”. 
For them the Jews were like an “illness” for humankind, and the idea was that if 
we kill all of them, we’ll gain back real humanity. Here we may find an insight we 
have to gain about what it means to be a human being. It is rather easy to give 
the human beings an orientation, a cultural orientation within which they are 
willing and able to kill others without any bad consciousness. In the name of a 
higher value, they can do it. That is the reason why I think we should think again 
of what it means to be a human being. This is also the reason why we should 
return to that classical idea (Kant, Humboldt, Herder) that every human is an 
individual, and represents humankind in a unique way. Here I find the content of 
Geschichtlichkeit: human beings live meaning in Geschichtlichkeit because they 
are as humans, as cultural beings, meaning and sense. Not only in language, 
but in everything that they do, and this has to be reflected, temporalized. By this 
reflection the temporality and historicity of the human life get a direction, and 
historical thinking gets a vision and an idea of temporal change as a meaningful 
history. With this idea we can now go on and do the work of the historian.
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